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MAKERS OF TORT LAW*
Marc Galanter**

Unlike some of the earlier Clifford Symposia that Steve Landsman
has organized, this one is inhabited, so far as I am aware, entirely by
law professors and judges. Sheltered from the appraisal of skeptical
outsiders, it is easy to indulge our professional deformation by sliding
into well-worn models of what law and lawmaking are, models that we
do not literally believe but that fit so comfortably the law school view
of the world of which we are complaining but compliant captives.
We slip easily into regarding the law as an orderly hierarchy in
which appellate judges interpret, and occasionally make, legal rules,
trial judges apply them and lawyers attempt to make or defeat claims
in terms of their alignment with these rules.1 So if we set out in quest
of tort lawmakers our inquiry gravitates to a search for appellate
judges making new bits of tort doctrine 6 la Cardozo or Traynor.
But we are also children of legal realism. At least some of the time
we take the "tort law" in the title of this Symposium as much more
than just the substantive law of torts declared by appellate judges. In
those moments, we are also concerned with the outcomes of cases
before the courts and in lawyers' offices, with the signals that actors
incorporate in their outlook and markers they guide themselves by or
take into account. In this broader reading tort law is not just tort doctrine, but is enmeshed with procedure, evidence, institutional practice,
the organization of law practices, the strategies of lawyers, the proclivity to claim, and much more. Research technologies, emerging fields
of knowledge, bodies of experts and public perceptions of injury and
assignments of responsibility, all affect the bringing of tort claims and
the response to them and ultimately the practices that tort regulates.
* A talk at the Clifford Symposium on Judges as Tort Lawmakers, DePaul University College
of Law, April 17, 1999.
** John and Rylla Bosshard Professor of Law and South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. I have tried to elaborate on this in The Futureof Law and Social Sciences Research, 52 N.C.
L. REV. 1060 (1974); The PortableSoc 2; Or What to Do Until the Doctrine Comes, in GENERAL
EDUCATION IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: CENTENNIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE COLLEGE OF THE

(J. MacAloon ed., 1992). For a new and intriguing critique, see Lynn
LoPucki & Walter Weyrauch, A Theory of Legal Strategy (forthcoming Duke Law Journal,
2000).
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Tort doctrine is only part of a far larger complex of rules, institutions,
practices and beliefs.
We swing between these two poles of (1) the image of tort as a body
of doctrine; and (2) the inclusive fuzzy picture of what we may call the
embodied tort process. If we inquire about judges as tort lawmakers,
the answers we will find depend on whether we are asking about the
doctrinal core or about the embodied process. If we ask about the
embodied tort process, we will find that the respective roles of appellate judges and trial judges are quite different that if we ask only
about the core. If we ask about the doctrinal core, appellate judges
loom large as the authors of tort law. But if we widen our view to the
entire process, the outcome-determinative power of the doctrinal formulations of judges shrinks as public perceptions, parties' resources,
and lawyers' strategies come into play. As Lynn Lopucki and Walter
Weyrauch put it: "one can no more predict the outcome of a case from
the facts and the law, than one can predict the outcome of a game of
chess from the positions of the pieces and the rules of the game. In
'2
either case, one needs to know who is playing."
Since the days of Cardozo or even Traynor, there is much more law:
more law-makers, more rules and doctrine, more lawyers, and more
legal actors who devote more resources to legal activity.3 As the system of rules becomes more complex-with the multiplication of decision points and in their train higher transaction costs-the discretion
of those who combine and apply them is increased. As Mirjan
Damaska observes, "there is a point beyond which increased complexity of law, especially in loosely ordered normative systems, objectively
increases rather than decreases the decision-maker's freedom. Contradictory views can plausibly be held and support found for almost
any position. '' 4 Rather than making the law more certain by tying
outcomes to the mandates of doctrine, the proliferation of law enlarges both judicial discretion and the scope for lawyer strategy by
multiplying the opportunities for innovative juxtaposition. Whether
these opportunities will be availed of depends on the resources of the
parties. "[T]he depth of clients' pockets determines, in important
part, the complexity of the legal issues with which their lawyers will be
permitted to deal." 5
2. LoPucki & Weyrauch, supra note 1.
3. Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV.

1 (1992).
4. Miran Damaska, Structures of Authority and Comparative Criminal Procedure,84 YALE
L.J. 480, 528 (1975).
5. HEINZ & LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS

129 (1982).
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Like lawyers, judges are supplied with incentives to innovate and
impress. 6 The hierarchy in which they are arrayed is not a bureaucracy. 7 Courts are, of course, bureaucracies in the loose sense of an
organization with division of labor, some hierarchic directions and
standardized work routines for serving clients according to specified
formulae. But judicial hierarchies lack many of the salient features of
bureaucratic control. As the late Herbert Jacob observed:
Appellate courts are usually not true hierarchic superiors to trial
courts... [t]hey may overrule trial court decisions [but t]heir review
... is initiated by litigants. It is not motivated by a policy focus of
the higher courts, nor does it constitute a systematic quality control
of the work of the trial courts.... Supreme Courts often promulgate
procedural rules that govern trial courts, but they exercise no continuous supervision over day-to-day trial work and almost none
over the flow of cases that trial courts process. They almost never
hire, transfer, or fire trial judges or other trial courtroom personnel.
They have little or no influence over trial court budgets.

Trial court judges have broad, unreviewed (and perhaps unreviewable) discretion.8 The situation was summed up incisively by Judge
Scott when he quipped that "As appellate judges we get to reverse a
holding of a trial judge every two or three years, but they reverse us
every day." 9 Trial court discretion has been greatly enlarged by modem procedure. "[T]the discretion of trial judges has expanded-partly
because of increased complexity-but even more so from the multiplication of discretionary procedural, evidentiary and management deci6. Anthony D'Amato, Legal Uncertainty, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1983).
7. Herbert Jacob, Courts as Organizations,in EMPIRICAL THEORIES ABOUr COURTS 193 (K.
Boyum & L. Mather eds., 1983). As the late Forrest Dill put it "courts are loosely connected
units enjoying substantial autonomy from each other and from units at higher levels of the system." Forrest Dill, Contradictions in Judicial Structure: Law and Bureaucracy in American
Criminal Courts, Paper presented at the Conference on Social Science Research in the Courts,
Denver Co, Jan. 20, 1977. See also the observation of Mirjan Damaska that the judges who
preside in the decentralized American courts systems that these observers have in mind are
invested with personal authority emanating from their offices, not by delegation from the top.
Damaska, supra note 4, at 515.
8. Stephen B. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 Wis.
L. REV. 631.
9. A century ago, a similar observation was attributed to "Fighting Bob" Bowling, a Kansas
City justice of the peace, who
made a ruling in the trial of a case that was not acceptable to the attorney on one side,
and he demurred to the decision of his Honor
"Your Honor, you are overruling the Supreme Court," said the lawyer.
"I do that every day, my friend; sit down," replied the justice, and his decision was

recorded.
Facetiae, 11 THE GREEN BAG 599 (1899).
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sions." 10 The expansion of managerial judging enlarges the discretion
of trial judges and diminishes the control of appellate judges:
Managerial decision involve a different, and more expansive, sort of
discretion than purely legal decisions. For one thing, a judge's managerial decisions typically are insulated from appellate review, because they are interlocutory in nature, often are made off the
record, and, in any event, typically are subject to a lenient "abuse of
discretion" standard of review. But the difference between legal decisions and managerial ones runs much deeper. When "judges
make legal decisions, the parties have an opportunity to marshal
arguments based on an established body of principles." . . .
[m]anagerial discretion is different in nature. Judges deciding how
to manage cases on their dockets have a wide array of tactics available and, indeed, choose to exercise their supervisory discretion in
widely disparate ways, even when handling the same exact case. 1 '
The vast majority of tort cases, along with cases of almost every
other kind, terminate by settlement. 12 Settlements entail "bargaining
in the shadow of the law,"'1 3 so the influence of tort doctrine is present, but is thoroughly mixed with considerations of expense, delay,
publicity and confidentiality, the state of the evidence, the availability
and attractiveness of witnesses, and a host of other contingencies that
lie beyond the substantive rules of tort law. It is "the law" in its broad
processual sense that casts the shadow, not merely its doctrinal core.
Indeed, the portion of the shadow cast by formal adjudication may
be shrinking. The percentage of cases going to trial continues to decline. 14 In the federal courts from 1961 to 1998, the portion of termi10. See, e.g., Michael D. Green, The Road Less Well Traveled (And Seen): ContemporaryLaw
Making in ProductsLiability, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 377 (1999) (on trial judges deciding to exclude
experts and eliminate cases). Molot argues that this is the smaller part of trial judge judge discretion: "[Wihile judicial leeway in deciding legal questions may contribute to litigation uncertainty, this uncertainty pales in comparison to that generated by purely discretionary
management decisions .. ." Jonothan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect

Changes in Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 963 (1998) (emphasis added).
11. Molot, supra note 10, at 1004-05. On activism among trial judges, see Marc Galanter et
al., The CrusadingJudge: JudicialActivism in Urban Trial Courts,52 S.CAL. L. REV. 699 (1979).
12. Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle:" Judicial Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STANFORD L. REV. 1339 (1994).
13. Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and
Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981).
14. Tort cases go to trial with greater frequency that almost any other kind of dispute. A
study of courts of the nation's 75 largest counties in 1996 found that fully two thirds of cases
disposed of by trial were torts. Indeed, most of the civil jury trials in this country are of tort
cases. CAROL J. DEFRANCES & MARIKA F.X. LITRAS, CIVIL TRIAL CASES AND VERDICTS IN
LARGE COUNTIES, 1996: CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS (Bureau of Justice Statistics,

1999).
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nations that were by trial dropped from 11% to 2.5%. 15 Although the
number of appeals has increased, the number subject to intensive full
dress review has declined. Appellate courts decide many more of
16
their cases without published opinions or without any opinion at all.
And increasingly they ratify what the courts below have done.
The papers in this Symposium depict continuing innovation by appellate judges 17 though few full blown new torts18 and even some retreat from earlier innovations. 19 The decline in initiative by appellate
judges, and their intellectual cousins, law professors, does not mark an
end to the dynamic change of torts law. "Control of litigation," Stephen Yeazell argues, "has moved further down the legal food chain,20
from appellate to trial courts and from trial courts to lawyers.
So we move from Cardozo and Prosser to entrepreneurial trial
judges like Jack Weinstein and Thomas Lambros and entreprenuerial
adjuncts like Francis McGovern and Kenneth Feinberg. The claims
they encounter are posed by entrepreneurial lawyers, more sophisticated and better resourced than their counterparts of half a century
ago. Unlike rights movements on behalf of discrete minorities (like
ethnic groups, the disabled, or gays) tort recovery involves relatively
rare events, so potential beneficiaries of the protection and remedy
afforded by tort tend to have low awareness of any given tort rule and
low incentives to invest in reforming it.21 Movements to establish new
rights in judicial forums depend on the organizational and financial
resources of enduring groups of advocates. 22 Apart from instances
where widespread and highly salient grievances enter the political process, as in the recent legislative battles over a "patients' bill of rights,"
tort beneficiaries tend to participate in the tort policy arena through
15. Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the Civil Jury, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE
CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 63 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993); Administrative Office of the Courts, Annual

Report.
16. Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: JudicialAdaptations to Caseload, 1990 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 3; William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273 (1996); Mitu Gulati &
C.M.A. McCauliff, On Not Making Law, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157 (1998).

17. Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 435 (1999).
18. Anita Bernstein, The New-Tort Centrifuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413 (1999).
19. Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent CaliforniaExperience With
"New" Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999).
20. Yeazell, supra note 8, at 647.
21. NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, EcoNOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY ch. 6 (1994).

22.

CHARLES

R.

Epp, THE

RIGHTS REVOLUTION:

LAWYERS,

ACTIVISTS, AND

SUPREME

COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998). For application of this perspective to prison

reform litigation, see Margo Schlanger, Beyond the Hero Judge: Institutional Reform Litigation
as Litigation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1994 (1999).
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surrogates like consumer organizations and especially plaintiffs' lawyers. This is worrisome because the latter have cross-cutting incentives not to eliminate uncertainty and risk from the remedy process.
In this Symposium, Jeffrey O'Connell worries that enrichment of the
upper strata of the plaintiffs bar by the tobacco and other mass tort
settlements will result in a disastrous "one issue" lobby that will distort the political process forever. The magnitude of such a danger exists seems exaggerated in view of the far greater institutionalization of
the anti-remedy lobby.
In short, today appellate judges are not the authors (if they ever
were) of change in tort law, but its editors and publishers. They are
the carpenters, not the architects, devising solutions to problems put
before them by lawyers, who construct these problems from the demands of claimants. The dynamic force that generates the problems is
not produced by judges, but by changing perceptions of injustice and
23
remedy.
Tort law is driven by and dependent on the production of injustice.
As the risks of everyday life have declined dramatically for most people, there is a widespread sense that science and technology can produce solutions for at least many of the remaining problems. 24 (Of
course, this is illusory inasmuch as people are capable of identifying or
inventing problems as quickly as they are solved.) But as more things
are capable of being done by human institutions, the line between unavoidable misfortune and imposed injustice shifts. The realm of injustice is enlarged. Once, having an incurable disease was an inalterable
misfortune; now a perception of insufficient vigor in pursuing a cure
or insufficient readiness to provide care can give rise to a claim of
injustice. As the scope of possible interventions broadens, more and
more terrible things become defined by the incidence of that intervention. Thus famine or social subordination or a flawed appearance is
not inalterable fate, but a matter of appropriate interventions. What
was seen as fate may be seen as inappropriate policy. 25 Advances in
human capability and rising expectations result in a moving frontier of
injustice. With more knowledge and education and advances in communication, moral entrepreneurs will construct, identify, and define
new injustices-and solicit remedies for them in legislative, adminis-

23. These, in turn arise within a culture suffused with themes crystallized in legal doctrine that
stimulate, limit, and channel the formulation of problems and solutions.
24.

LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE

25.

JUDITH SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE (1990).

(1985).
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trative and judicial forums. 26 In torts as elsewhere, the supply of unanswered questions increases in tandem with the supply of answers.

26. Richard Abel suggests that courts may be more responsive than legislatures to such solicitation than legislatures. Richard L. Abel, Questioning the Counter-MajoritarianThesis: The
Case of Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 533 (1999).
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